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The paper discusses the relevance of past concerns about trade and foreign 
direct investment diversion to the detriment of Asian suppliers and hosts as a 
result of EU integration deepening and widening in the nineties. Based on 
recent empirical evidence, these concerns are rejected. As concerns integration 
deepening through the Single Market Program (SMP), trade resistance factors 
on the EU import side can be explained mainly by slow growth in Europe in the 
first half of the nineties rather than by SMP-induced trade barriers. Concerning 
integration widening toward Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), higher trade 
and investment shares of CEE are seen as a process of normalization which 
materialized earlier than the effects of the Europe Agreements. As trade 
overlaps between Asian and CEE supply on EU markets are low, the trade 
diversion fear is not well-founded. The paper also addresses the likely 
implications of the Single European Currency for Asia. Preliminary findings 
suggest that short-term implications are small but qualifications have to be 
made given the insufficient data base concerning the use of European currencies 
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 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEEPENING AND WIDENING:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA 
 
 
I.  Introduction:Where EU Integration Effects Come From and How 
They Are Transmitted to Asia1 
EU integration basically comprises two elements, integration deepening and 
integration widening. The process of integration deepening first aims at the 
economic union in the real sector, that is borderless movements of persons, 
physical capital, goods and services with necessary policy harmonisation either 
through ex ante administrative decisions or ex post market processes. The latter 
is made possible by mutually recognising national standards and allowing them 
to compete against each other. Second, integration deepening in the monetary 
sector is carried out by the European Monetary Union project (EMU) which in 
its third stage (irreversibly fixing bilateral parities between the national 
currencies and the Euro) starts on 1 January 1999.  
  Integration widening is equivalent to the fourth enlargement round (after 
1973, 1981/87, 1995) which encompasses the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs). This process is slotted in various parts of which the first 
                                                            
1  Asia in the following is confined to the ASEM countries thus excluding South Asia. The 
rationale of „splitting Asia“ is not only based on performance criteria as East and 
Southeast Asia has been the most dynamic region both as a purchaser of EU products and 
as a competitive supplier on EU markets but also on  the fact that the intensity of economic 
interactions between South Asia and East and Southeast Asia has been low. Thus, the two 
regions appear as different entities.     2 
comprises those countries chosen by the EU as being most advanced in 
economic transformation and democratic institution-building. These countries 
are the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia plus Cyprus the 
latter being the one of three countries with which the EU concluded Association 
Agreements in the sixties and seventies (the other two countries being Turkey 
and Malta). CEECs will have to pass through a long transition period before 
they are truly part and parcel of the Single Market. 
  Each of the two major elements has effects on third countries. Integration 
deepening can impact upon trade, income, investment and hence economic 
growth in the EU and thereby can influence income-induced and price-induced 
import demand for goods and services as well as regional patterns of investment 
of domestic and foreign companies. Such effects can materialise even if the 
absolute level of border protection remains constant. Third countries’ income 
can additionally be affected via integration-induced terms of trade effects. 
Finally, integration deepening can also impact upon migration patterns but since 
migration is restricted and migration costs are often high, this effect will be 
omitted in the following. The same holds for public funds. With very few 
exceptions, East and Southeast Asian countries do not belong to the group of 
major aid recipients. Thus, this is not an important channel of resource flows 
from Europe to Asia.   3 
  Integration effects can be „once and for all“ (static trade and income 
effects)) without changing savings behaviour investment levels but they can also 
be labelled dynamic if a larger market carries scale economies and thus 
influences investment decisions. Integration deepening in the monetary sector 
carries the most speculative and uncertain effects on third countries via the role 
of the Euro as invoice currency, reserve currency, anchor currency and as a 
currency for financial transactions. 
  The effects of integration widening are traditionally rooted in the customs 
union literature and thus are summarised under trade creation vs trade diversion. 
In a dynamic setting, the question of whether investment is diverted from non-
member countries to the new members has received even more attention 
recently, after EU preference margins declined with the lowering of tariffs on an 
MFN basis. Given that trade costs (defined as costs of bridging economic 
distance) between the EU and the CEECs are low, changes in access conditions 
between non-preferred Asia and preferred CEECs can principally trigger 
diversion effects. 
  Finally, a deepened and widened Union perhaps may follow different 
strategies in international fora (such as the WTO) or bi-regional fora (such as 
ASEM) compared to the old EEC-6 and thus again may affect income, trade and 
capital flows of Asian countries indirectly.   4 
  The paper is organised in a way that these possible repercussions of 
integration deepening and widening are taken into account for Asia which 
includes developing Asia and Japan. Section II briefly stylises the state of 
economic interactions (trade and capital flows) between the EU and Asia by the 
mid-nineties and the way toward this state. Section III links the state of 
economic interactions to EU policy measures in order to gauge the responsibility 
of the EU integration process (basically the Single Market Program (SMP)) for 
changing bilateral trade and investment patterns. Both measures for integration 
deepening and widening are considered separately as concerns their likely 
effects upon Asia. 
  Section IV takes a forward looking view by speculating about possible 
future changes in Asian trade and capital transactions due to further EU 
deepening and widening. Again, this view will differentiate between the real and 
the monetary sector. Section V concludes on the results. 
II.  Stylised Facts of Europe-Asia Economic Transactions 
1.   Asian Trade Performance on EU Markets 
The Asian trade performance on EU markets in recent past can be characterised 
by a slight increase in shares in extra-EU imports from about  25 per cent to 28 
per cent between 1988 and 1996. This overall rise hides two opposing trends. 
The Japanese share decreased by more than 3 percentage points to 9 per cent 
   5 
whereas developing Asia improved its position by 6 per percentage point to 
almost 19 per cent (Table 1). Among developing Asia, the share of the four 
Asian NICs stagnated while those of ASEAN (excluding Singapore) and China 
rose. Hence, overall the lower-income Asian countries fared better than the 
higher- income Asian countries which seems to support more the classical inter-
industry division of labour between regions with large differences in factor 
endowment and factor price ratios (the HOS pattern) than the intra-industry 
division of labour (the Grossman-Helpman pattern). Memo data on the EU 
export side in Table 1 yield that Asia became a much more dynamic export 
market for Europe than Asia became for Europe as a sourcing market. This 
finding underlines previous more detailed analyses on Europe-Asia trade 
patterns which identify trade resisting factors to be more on the European import 
side than 
 
Table 1 – Synopsis of European-Asian Trade Relations 
  Share in extra-EU 15 imports 
  Asian  
NICs 4 
ASEAN China  Asia 
excl. Japan 
Japan Total  East 
and South-
east Asia 
1988  7.1 3.5 2.0 12.6 12.7 25.3 
1990  6.4 4.0 2.6 13.0 11.7 24.7 
1992  6.8 5.1 3.9 15.8 12.2 28.0 
1994  6.7 6.2 4.7 17.6 10.4 28.0 
1996  7.0 6.6 5.2 18.8     9.1 27.9 
           
For comparison:  Share in extra-EU 15 exports 
1988  6.0 3.4 1.8 11.2 5.3 16.5 
1996  8.6 6.5 2.4 17.5 5.7 23.2   6 
Source: EU: European Economy, No. 3, 1997: 202-209. 
 
on the European import side than on the Asian import side [Drysdale and 
Garnaut, 1993; Fukasaku and Martineau, 1996; Langhammer, 1998]. Whether 
trade-resisting factors during this period can be explained more by growth 
differentials between rapidly growing Asia and slowly growing Europe than by 
higher policy-induced barriers in the EU compared to Asia, cannot be answered 
without in-depth analysis. Yet, the fact that higher-income Asian countries 
producing relatively capital-intensive items showed a weaker export 
performance than China and the ASEAN countries supplying more labour-
intensive goods supports the hypothesis that unbalanced trade resistance seems 
to have been caused more by growth differentials than by trade-restricting 
measures. However, the latter should not be neglected. Effective trade-
restricting policy measures in the EU became stronger in more capital-intensive 
items (cars, electrical equipment, ships, steel) than in clothing and footwear. In 
fact, there is much evidence that by the end of the eighties, domestic adjustment 
in labour-intensive products had already been largely accomplished in the EU so 
that EU tariff protectionism in typical labour-intensive products became more 
redundant than EU non-tariff protectionism (subsidies, VERs, anti-dumping) in 
more capital-intensive products. 
 
   7 
  Over a longer period, a comparison between the absorptive capacity of the 
three major trading partners (EU, US, Japan) vis-à-vis Asian supply can shed 
more light on the relative openness of EU markets. Estimates of ex-post average 
propensities of import demand of the three partners draw a fairly positive picture 
of the EU (Table 2). During 1974-1990, that is the period between the first oil 
price shock and the collapse of socialist Europe, the EU propensities vis-à-vis 
developing Asian supply (3.2) slightly exceeded the US propensity (3.0) and 
were widely ahead of the Japanese propensity (0.9). As concerns the propensity 
for the first half of the nineties, the EU propensity (4.9) was even much higher 
than that of the US (2.4) but smaller than that of Japan. The reason is that prior 
to 1974, the US was already a major export market for Asia whereas the EU 
 
Table 2 – Ex-Post Propensitiesa of Import Demand of Major Asian Trading Partners 
vis-á-vis Asian Supply, 1974-1995 
Exporting region  Imports of 
   US  EU-15  Japan 
Developing Asia  1974-90 3.0  3.2  0.9 
(incl. China)  1990-95  2.4 4.9 5.6 
      
Japan  1974-90  3.7 4.9  – 
  1990-95  1.2 0.3  – 
        
aDefined as the ratio between average growth of nominal Asian (Japanese) exports 
deflated with the Asian (Japanese) GDP deflator and average real GDP growth of 
importing regions. For Europe, growth rates of G-4 (Germany, Italy, France, UK) is 
taken as the yardstick for economic growth of the EU. 
Source: Own calculations from UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues. – 
World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, 1997.   8 
 
emerged as a new market after the mid-seventies. The Japanese market became 
open at a much later stage only. The same holds true for the propensity toward 
the Japanese supply. It was not until the nineties that the US showed a higher 
average import propensity toward Japanese products than the EU. It cannot be 
excluded that apart from trade policies and growth differentials also exchange 
rate volatility between the European currencies, the Yen and the Dollar may 
have influenced such differences and changes in propensities. These findings do 
not contradict the hypothesis mentioned above that trade-resisting factors were 
stronger on the EU import side than on the Asian import side. Probably, Asian 
average import toward Europe were even higher than those of the EU toward 
Asia. In general, the estimates do not place the EU behind the US as concerns 
import propensities. Overall, it is important to note that in spite of strongly 
reduced economic growth in Europe in the first half of the nineties import 
demand toward Asian products was not curtailed but was maintained especially 
toward products from lower-income Asian countries. 
  A particular concern in Asia after 1989 has been growing competition 
with CEECs on EU markets. This concern has been rooted in low economic 
distance between the EU and the CEECs, traditional trade links from the pre-war 
period, complementarity in resource endowment and, consequently, relatively 
low labour costs compared to Western Europe. In fact, gravity models reveal   9 
that the „normal“ pre-war intensity of trade between Western and Eastern 
Europe became rapidly re-established long before the full impact of the bilateral 
free trade agreements (Europe Agreements) materialised [Piazolo, 1997]. Yet, 
given widely unchanged EU agricultural protection against CEECs and 
contingent protection measures against so-called „sensitive“ industrial products, 
the rise of CEECs share in extra-EU imports (including the successor states of 
the former USSR) was not spectacular (from 10.1 per cent in 1990 to 11.3 per 
cent in 1996). 
  More important for East Asia is the question of substitutability between its 
supply and that of CEECs in order to assess how strongly the two regions 
compete with their exports on EU markets. A suitable indicator is the Finger-
Kreinin trade overlap index. Based on estimating overlaps between the 
developing Asia supply and the supply of individual CEECs (at the 4-digit HS 
level), one can conclude that overlaps scaled for the range 0-100 have been 
relatively small (up to 36) without a clear trend until 1996 (Table 3). While East 
and Southeast Asia reduced the share of typical labour-intensive products in its 
exports to the EU, for instance textiles from 20 per cent to 13 per cent between 
1988 and 1995, CEECs either showed an increase or kept shares of labour-
intensive products largely constant. In future, it is more likely that the relatively 
strong human capital endowment in the advanced CEECs and their accession to 
the EU will lead to more rapidly rising wages for both skilled and – as a 
complementary factor – also unskilled labour than we can expect for the more   10 
unskilled labour-abundant Asian economies. This would suggest trade overlaps 
not to rise. 
Table 3 – Trade Overlapsa: Central and Eastern Europe vs. East and Southeast 
Asia, 1989-1993 (percentage points) 
  Food products  Non-food products 
  (HS 01-24)  (HS 25-99) 
  1989 1993 1996 1989 1993 1996 
Poland  16.8 23.3  24.0  29.4 31.2  31.1 
Hungary 17.1  19.5  20.8 30.6  36.0  36.3 
Czechoslovakia 12.5  21.1b –  25.5  31.1b – 
Czech.  Republic  – 22.4  19.7 – 33.6  33.8 
Slovakia  – 16.1  16.0 – 27.0  26.0 
Bulgaria  16.9 20.8  24.2  25.0 32.3  26.8 
Romania  11.9 17.3  21.9  23.0 29.9  27.3 
aThe overlap index is calculated by computing the percentage share of each 
product in total food or non-food EU imports from each country. This gives 
two values (percentage shares), one from each country, for every product 
group. The index is defined as the sum, over all food or non-food product 
groups, of the smaller of the two values. Figures are based on 4-digit 
commodity groupings of the Harmonised System (HS). Asian countries 
include Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea. – b1992. 
Source: Eurostat (various issues). – Own calculations. 
 
2.  Foreign Direct Investment 
Compared to the intensity of trade links between East and Southeast Asia and 
the EU and compared to the growth record of Asia, European FDI in Asia has 
always been surprisingly low. It seems that European companies have a clear 
preference of exports over FDI. Given severe data bottlenecks as concerns EU   11 
outward FDI figures instead of individual EU countries’ figures, any firm 
conclusion is flawed by incompleteness, incomparability, and ageing database. 
Stock data for the three major EU countries (France, Germany, UK) which are 
reported to account for about 80 per cent of FDI in Asia suggest the developing 
Asia share in total EU FDI to have even declined between 1985 and 1993. 
According to these data, the share has shrunk from 4.4 per cent to 3.8 per cent 
(Table 4). Viewed from the host country side, the EU ranked third with about 13 
per cent of total FDI stock in developing Asia in 1993 (US: 14 per cent, Japan 
21 per cent; European Economy [1997: 231]). More recent data support the view 
that the mid-nineties have become a turning point. Langhammer [1998: 240] 
reports 1994 figures for individual EU member states (based on OECD data) 
which approach US levels. Even more recent German stock data [Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 1998] yield that by end 1996 developing Asia accounted for 5.5 
per cent of total German extra-EU FDI. Investment in Japan accounted for 4.5 
per cent. Still, however, these are small amounts compared to traditionally high 
German investment in Latin America (Brazil: 6.5 per cent in 1996) or in the 
three leading CEECs (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary: 6.3 per cent). Whether 
the investment diversion argument can be supported from the rapid rise of 
investment in CEECs will be discussed below. 
 
 
Table 4 – Share of Developing Asia in French, German and UK FDI Stock in 
the World, by Industry 1985 and 1993 (in per cent)   12 
 1985  1993 
Printing sector  6.0  7.1 
Manufacturing 3.4  3.7 
of which     
Food products  6.6  2.4 
Textile, leather, clothing  0.5  1.5 
Chemicals 4.2  7.4 
Electrical equipment  3.1  3.0 
Motor vehicles  0.8  0.5 
Other transport equipment  11.8  2.0 
Tertiary sector  4.3  2.8 
of which     
Construction  8.6    0 
Transport & storage  31.4  0.9 
Finance, insurance  6.2  2.4 
Other services  2.6  3.4 
All sectors  4.4  3.8 
Source: See Table 1: 227. 
 
3. Bank  Lending 
Neither FDI nor bank lending are resource flows which are directly influenced 
by EU integration policies. Indirectly, however, these policies may have 
impacted upon capital account transactions. As concerns FDI, trade facilitation 
and liberalisation could be expected to induce export-oriented FDI to engage in 
EU partner countries provided that the domestic policy framework was 
appropriate. With respect to bank lending, liberalisation of banking services 
within the EU under the SMP has triggered a wave of mergers and acquisitions 
and has deepened European financial markets. Preparations for the EMU project 
were also instrumental to remove market segmentation in Europe. It is therefore 
no surprise that the Single Market helped European banks to become more 
global.   13 
  Interestingly, it is Asia which has become Europe’s major global playing 
field. Between end-1995 and end-1997 European banks increased their share in 
total international bank lending to Asia from 38.6 per cent to 47.1 per cent and 
accounted for almost two thirds of incremental bank lending to Asia during this 
period (BIS 1998). The same share in incremental lending can be observed with 
respect to lending to all developing countries. Following the BIS data, German 
banks took the lead in European lending to Asia followed by UK and French 
banks. More than half of the increase in the Asian exposure of German banks in 
the first half of 1997 was accounted for by Malaysia and China and by the end 
of June 1997 German banks had the highest level of European exposure to South 
Korea and Thailand while still well below Japanese banks. 
  A closer look to German short-term bank claims toward Asian countries, 
however, reveals that European banks have not only been late-coming but also 
early-leaving. Between June 1997 (shortly before the outbreak of the Thai crisis) 
and September 1997, German banks reduced their short-term claims toward 
Thailands by one third. Whether such „last in-first out“ behaviour significantly 
differs from that of Japanese or US banks is open to scrutiny. Yet, if a high 
degree of risk aversion should really be found typical for European banks and if 
because of European banks being later-comers this risk perception should have 
been ex ante unknown to risk-prone Asian debtors, the mismatch of risk 
perception in European lender-Asian borrower relationship can have introduced  
additional volatility and vulnerability in short-term lending.   14 
III.  Can Past Europe-Asia Trade and Investment Patterns be Explained by 
EU Integration Policies? 
1.  The Trade Diversion Issue 
For many years, Asian concerns against European integration have centred on 
the general assumption that discriminatory integration policies would impede 
Asian exporter’s access to the EU. This assumption had two facets.2 
  First, the SMP was feared to favour domestic producers in perfectly 
competitive markets over external imports as a result of declining internal trade 
costs (abandoning inner border controls, harmonisation of indirect taxation and 
technical standards, mutual recognition of national well-established regulations). 
For products under imperfect competition and increasing scale economies, the 
larger market would give rise to concentration processes and again push cost 
efficiency of EU products. In both cases, domestic producers would gain in 
competitiveness even if the absolute level of external protection would remain 
constant. In few products where prior to the Single Market still nationally 
different protection levels prevailed and where the Single Market required 
harmonisation of these levels (for instance, in cars, sensitive textiles, bananas) 
Asian exporters had specific concerns. They feared that the formerly relatively 
open large national markets (such as Germany in the abovementioned products) 
                                                            
2  In the following, the special case of the clearly discriminatory EU Common Agricultural 
Policy with its implications for special Asian exporters, such as Thai cassava exporters, is 
not taken into consideration. Nor is competition between Asian non-preferred and ACP 
preferred exporters of tropical agricultural products on EU markets addressed. These   15 
would surrender to demands of protection raised by the formerly relatively 
closed smaller national markets (such as the Mediterranean EU member 
markets) and that the net result of harmonised external policies would be worse 
for Asia than the prior-Single Market situation of different national policies. 
  This first facet is not the classical Vinerian trade diversion case. This case 
underlies the second facet. In this facet, integration widening toward third 
countries, in particular toward CEECs, is feared to divert trade from low-cost 
Asian suppliers to high-cost CEECs suppliers. 
  To start with the first facet, during the early nineties, there has been an 
extensive theoretical and empirical discussion on the implications of the Single 
Market for extra-EU trade. As concerns Asia, different assumptions and 
estimates on price elasticities led to large variety of findings for different 
countries, regions and sectors. In a survey article, Hallett [1994] critically 
discusses partial equilibrium analyses by Davenport [1990] , Davenport and 
Page [1990], Langhammer [1990], Matthews and McAleese [1990], Page 
[1991], Nicolaides [1990] and Stevens [1990]. 
  Findings range from optimistic scenarios [Langhammer] with trade and 
income gains for EU external trading partners to pessimistic scenarios 
[Davenport and Page] with trade diversion exceeding so-called external trade 
creation (income-induced higher EU demand for external imports). The former 
                                                                                                                                                                       
traditional issues were analysed in detail in various articles in a volume edited by   16 
result is based on high ex-post income elasticities of EU demand for products 
supplied by fast growing exporters of manufactures (basically comprising the 
Asian exporters) so that external trade creation would outweigh trade diversion 
by a factor of 4. The latter result assumes higher substitution elasticities between 
EU supply and third country supply thus leading trade diversion to outweigh 
trade creation. What all studies have in common is that in perfectly competitive 
markets (probably the bulk of Asian supply in manufactures) the static trade 
effects are small in terms of GDP (less than a percentage point). Second, effects 
of harmonising quotas in few sensitive items could not be assessed given the 
uncertainties on the outcome of political bargaining between the more open 
traders in the EU, on the one hand, and the more restrictive traders on the other 
hand. Third, terms of trade gains arising from lower import prices of net 
importers of capital goods outside the EU due to enhanced competitiveness of 
EU suppliers should be taken into account. For developing Asia being in a 
position of a net importer, this would be a gain. 
  As concerns Asia in particular, Page [1992] notes gains for commodity-
exporting ASEAN countries because of positive external trade creation and lack 
of EU domestic substitutes. On the other hand, Asian exporters of manufactures 
would lose because of trade diversion not being outweighed by positive terms of 
trade effects. Kreinin and Plummer [1992] join the „pessimistic“ view by 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Langhammer and Rieger [1988].     17 
arguing that Asian manufacturers would have to incur a decline in export prices 
in order to cope with EU Mediterranean competitors who would enjoy tariff 
savings because of being full member states. This view was questioned by 
Langhammer [1994] in a detailed analysis of the Taiwanese export performance. 
He states that NIEs with a strong element of product innovation and up-grading 
including high service components would not have to fear trade diversion. 
  Finally, with respect to post-1992 effects, Verbiest and Tang [1991] in an 
ADB study on the medium-term effects of EU-1992 find increasing external 
trade creation over six years of SMP implementation, the magnitude for 
individual countries being dependent on the degree of trade intensity with the 
EU. 
  Evaluating the 1990-1995 access conditions of Asian suppliers on EU 
markets, there is more support for the optimistic view though the counterfactual 
is difficult to specify and though the dramatic shocks of the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc plus the post-German reunification boom in Europe and the 
subsequent recession have made a reliable stock-taking almost impossible. What 
is certain is that the harmonisation of national quotas did not prove to be a major 
disadvantage to Asia since parallel commitments of phasing out quotas made in 
the multilateral trade negotiations have widely contained the trade-restricting 
potential of quotas. Except for the special case of quotas on Japanese cars which 
expire at end-1999, the MFA quotas which are to be phased out under the UR,   18 
and few quotas against an allegedly state-trading economy like China, quotas are 
no longer an important trade policy issue in manufacturing.3 
  The second facet, the possible extent of Asian losses in trading with the 
EU due to CEECs having free access to the EU, has been analysed by Horne 
[1995] and Horne and Huang [1996]. In the first paper, Horne [1995] applies 
different approaches of measuring factor endowments in CEECs and Asia and 
finds the former region (excluding the former Soviet Union) closely located to 
non-NIE East Asia in the Leamer Triangle of natural resources, unskilled labour 
and capital [Anderson, 1991]. Using measures of trade intensity, 
complementarity and trade bias (the latter being a measure of the relative 
strength of trade resistances), he finds CEECs and non-NIE East Asia to directly 
compete for export markets in unskilled labour-intensive goods. From this 
finding, there is a short way to identify trade diversion in case of privileged 
access of CEECs to the EU. Welfare losses as a result of trade diversion have 
been found to vary according to the degree of trade discrimination [Horne, 
Huang, 1996]. In a static CGE model, such losses are assessed to be the largest 
for Asia if CEECs and the EU would mutually concede free trade thus giving 
also EU producers on CEEC markets privileged access against Asian 
competitors (and not only CEEC producers privileged access against Asian 
competitors on EU markets). They are the lowest if free trade between EU and 
                                                            
3  Tariff quotas under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) are not considered here 
since the GSP is not part of negotiable trade policy but a substitute of non-negotiable aid   19 
CEECs would also imply that tariffs on CEEC imports from non-EU countries 
are removed as well. Between the two cases, the case of non-reciprocal 
unilateral removal of EU tariff barriers against imports from Eastern Europe is 
located. In terms of trade volumes, the decline of Asian exports to the EU is a 
small fraction of a percentage point. 
  The study does not take external liberalisation of the EU into account 
which runs parallel to integration widening. Since implementation of the 
Uruguay Round commitments is pursued simultaneously to implementing the 
free trade agreement between EU and CEECs and since both EU and CEECs are 
WTO Contracting Parties, the trade diversion effects are overstated. What is also 
neglected is the impact of integration widening on the changes of the price of 
non-tradables in CEECs. Within the process of removing trade barriers between 
CEECs and the EU, CEECs’ exchange rates have been subject to real 
appreciation since prices of non-tradables (basically labour) rose faster than 
prices of tradables subject to international competition and since former non-
tradables became tradables. Such exchange rate changes were basically driven 
by capital account rather than by current account transactions. Foreign risk 
capital inflows in Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic have favoured the use of 
the complementary factor, skilled labour, and have via wage bargaining also 
driven the price of unskilled labour upward. This has partly eroded price 
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competitiveness which CEECs owed to discriminatory trade policies. In short, it 
is questionable whether a traditional static analysis of discriminatory trade 
policies comes to realistic results in transformation economies in which a new 
capital stock and related productivity gains lead to overproportionate rises of 
prices of labour both skilled and unskilled compared to goods prices. Real 
appreciation is at the same time a productivity whip for CEECs. For real 
appreciation to be sustainable, a permanent up-grading of the product supply is 
required. Translated into the Leamer triangle context, this would also mean that 
after successful transformation (as it appears to be in the aforementioned three 
CEECs), East Asia and the CEECs are no longer located as closely to each other 
in the triangle as at the beginning of transformation. 
  In short, there is a case for arguing that trade diversion between CEECs 
and East Asia  is even less of a problem than the Horne/Huang results suggest in 
terms of small numbers. 
2.  The Investment Diversion Issue 
With capital becoming increasingly mobile and with domestic market 
orientation being no longer the dominant motive of FDI, outsourcing within 
industries (“slicing up the value added chain“) has driven outward investment. 
Such push from globalisation is independent of integration policy measures but 
can lead to specific regional structures of investment flows if such measures 
make some hosts more attractive than others. It is probably because of the tail   21 
wind from globalisation why the investment diversion issue has recently gained 
more attention than the trade diversion issue. This conclusion can be drawn from 
the aforementioned studies which discussed the external implications of the 
Single Market and unanimously rated investment diversion more important than 
trade diversion. 
  As in trade diversion, one can distinguish between the first facet, the 
growing attractiveness of the EU as host for FDI relative to other hosts, and the 
second facet, the growing attractiveness of the CEECs as hosts in the course of 
acceding to the EU. In both cases one can argue that risk premia on investment 
decline with accession thus shifting the ratios between rates of returns of 
investment between EU hosts and non-EU hosts on the one hand and between 
CEEC hosts and Asian hosts on the other hand to the benefit of the EU and 
CEECs, respectively. 
  The first facet has been narrowed down to the question whether one can 
observe a redirection of FDI toward the EU in the aftermath of the SMP. Such 
redirection can reasonably be assumed to be sector-specific because of 
substantial differences in driving forces behind investment decisions of 
industrial sectors. Hence, redirection would be reflected in (i) differences in the 
sectoral composition of FDI between regions and (ii) changes in the composition 
in specific host country regions over time. To put it differently, arguments 
against investment diversion would be supported if sectoral structures of FDI   22 
across regions would be similar and if the composition would remain stable over 
time. This test has been performed for four EU home countries (France, 
Germany, Netherlands, UK) with sufficiently disaggregated FDI data for two 
periods, a pre-SMP period (1985-87) and a post-SMP period (1990-92) 
[Agarwal et al., 1994: 317-325]. The choice of the latter period was motivated 
by the observation that the credible announcement of the SMP induced investors 
to respond rapidly to the new policy environment by increasing intra-EU 
investment. The results of correlation analyses were rather inconsistent with 
pronounced investment diversion. First, the composition of FDI in non-EU 
industrialised countries and in developing countries was similar to that 
prevailing within the EU in the first period (statistically significant correlation 
coefficients between sectoral shares in total FDI within and outside the EU). An 
outlier was UK FDI in developing Asia. Its sectoral structure differed from UK 
intra-EU investment both in the first and the second period. The second test 
(changes over time) yielded that the pattern observed in the post-SMP period 
was largely the same as in the pre-SMP period. Again, correlation coefficients 
between the two patterns were significantly positive. 
  Hence, the SMP did not result in a pronounced reorientation of intra-EU 
FDI to sectors for which gains from integration deepening were expected to be 
particularly large, the capital-intensive sectors.   23 
  To further substantiate this finding of fairly limited investment diversion 
due to the SMP, changes in the share of intra-EU FDI in total FDI in the 
respective sector were analysed. For investment diversion to occur, one would 
expect an increase of this share as a necessary condition. As a matter of fact, the 
intra-EU share has increased for most of the manufacturing industries while FDI 
shares of other industrialised countries declined. Hence, developing countries’ 
hosts escaped investment diversion. As concerns Asia, even in the case of 
Germany where FDI shares of developing countries declined, Asia did not 
suffer. Instead, German FDI stocks in Asia expanded slightly while the 
traditional host region for German FDI in developing countries, Latin America, 
incurred losses not because of the SMP but because of Latin American problems 
in coping with the debit crisis and subsequent structural adjustment. 
  A final empirical argument against this first facet of investment diversion 
can be drawn from a simple correlation exercise which compares the sectoral 
changes of intra-EU FDI with the corresponding changes of extra-EU FDI in 
developing Asia. The pro investment diversion hypothesis would be that growth 
of extra-EU FDI was relatively low or even negative in sectors for which intra-
EU FDI expanded most rapidly. Hence, correlation coefficients should be 
negative. Such a pattern does not show up. Most of the coefficients were 
insignificant.   24 
  In general, it must be accepted that due to the small number of 
observations (because of the relatively high level of sectoral aggregation), these 
findings must be cautiously interpreted. But one does not find a consistent 
pattern for the assumption that the development of extra-EU FDI in Asia and 
other developing countries was significantly adversely affected by the expansion 
of intra-EU FDI. 
  The second facet refers to the possible diversion of investment from Asia 
to CEECs. Unfortunately, this issue cannot be simply limited to the question of 
relocating existing investment from Asia to the CEECs due to privileged 
treatment. It is more important to address the issue whether investment which 
otherwise had been attracted by Asia has now been attracted by the CEECs and 
that domestic investment in the EU was foregone due to new opportunities 
beyond the eastern EU border. Note that growth of real gross capital formation 
during the first half of the nineties in the EU was zero and that this might have 
also been explained by the new attractiveness of CEECs. Finally, even if one 
identifies the attractiveness of CEEC hosts for EU FDI relative to other host 
regions, it is still open whether this is due to EU integration policies launched 
via the Europe Agreements or whether it is the transformation process itself 
which induced resources to flow into a well-endowed region which was isolated 
since World War II. The credibility of economic transformation was supported 
by EU policies but without comprehensive domestic reforms in institution 
building, stabilisation and adjustment EU policies would have been obsolete.   25 
This is demonstrated by the cases of the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria and 
Romania. EU assistance was neither necessary nor sufficient for CEECs to 
become attractive hosts. 
  What is beyond any doubt is that CEECs (primarily the three leading 
countries Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) have become very attractive 
hosts during the first half of the nineties. This is most clearly demonstrated for 
Germany, the by far most important EU investor in CEECs. Between 1990 and 
1996, the share of CEECs in German FDI stock rose by a factor of twelve to 3.6 
per cent and thus in 1996 was sizeably larger than the sum of investment in the 
three NIEs plus Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines (Table 5). Neither US 
nor Japanese investors engaged in CEECs worth mentioning though the 
advantages of privileged access to EU markets were not confined to EU 
investors. Instead, non-EU investors in CEECs were eligible for the same 
treatment as EU investors.4 This is a first indicator against investment diversion. 
A second indicator is that German investment in Asian economies (NIEs and 
ASEAN-3) rose as well, admittedly at much slower speed than investment in 
CEECs. A third indicator draws upon a detailed comparative study on motives to 
invest in CEECs [Agarwal, 1996]. If investment motives are splitted into 
                                                            
4  There could be the argument that unlike non-EU investors, EU investors benefit from rules 
of origin tailored in favour of supply of inputs from the EU (the so-called home country 
content rule). However, this argument is not convincing. Non-EU-based investors who 
produce in the EU and consider outlocating part of their production to the CEECs can 
easily take advantage of these rules in the same way as EU companies. There is non-
discrimination between EU-based and non-EU-based investors.     26 
primary commodity extraction, domestic market orientation in manufacturing 
and cost orientation in manufacturing, it is basically the third motive which 
could give rise to investment diversion. However, survey results demonstrate 
that the advantages of low labour costs as a motive to invest in CEECs have not 
been as relevant as the domestic market orientation [OECD, 1993]. 
  Overall, Agarwal [1996: 162] concludes that „there is so far no evidence 
of any meaningful diversion of FDI from developing countries to the EA 
countries (the Europe Agreement countries, R.J.L.)“. He also argues that the 
scope for investment diversion continues to be limited for two reasons. First, a 
sizeable portion of FDI is in primary and tertiary activities which are not prone 
to investment diversion because of binding investment to the availability of an 
immobile factor (a natural resource, for instance). Nor is investment prone for 
diversion which is targeted to the domestic market. Second, in cost-oriented 
investment, CEECs will see some of their initial cost advantages vanishing in 
the course of acceding to the EU. Finally, strong economic growth in CEECs 
catching up will promote domestic demand for products supplied by developing 
countries, for instance, Asia which in turn would lead to additional flows of FDI 
in these countries. Table 5 – Share of Emerging Markets in FDI Stocks of Germany, US, Japan, 1990 and 1996, on Changes in Stocks (flows) 
  Germany  Share in  US  Share in 
changes 
Japan Share  in 
changes 
Host countries  Share in stocks  flows  Share in stocks  in stocks  Share in stocks  in stocks 
  1990 1996  1996-1997  1990 1996  1996  compared   
to 1994b 
1990 1996  1996  compared 
to 1994c 
BIG-5  2.9 4.1  5.1 4.1 4.8  6.1 6.8 8.4  12.7 
Brazil  2.4 2.8  1.1 3.3 3.3  3.9 2.1 1.8  1.1 
China  0.1 0.7  2.3  0 0.4  0.6 0.9 2.8  6.6 
India  0.2 0.2  0.4 0.1 0.1  0.2 0.1 0.1  1.2 
Indonesia  0.1 0.1  0.2 0.7 1.0  1.4 3.7 3.7  3.8 
Russia 0.1a  0.3  0.6 0  n.a.  n.a. 0 0  0 
            
NIEs  (South  Korea,  0.8 1.2  1.7 1.9 3.0  3.1 4.3 4.1  3.9 
Singapore,  Taiwan)              
              
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
0.3 3.6  9.0  0 0.8  1.9  0 0.1  0 
(excl.  Russia)              
              
ASEAN-3  (Malaysia,  0.3 0.6  1.1 1.1 1.7  2.9 2.9 3.8  4.8 
Philippines,  Thailand)              
Total  4.3  9.3  16.8  7.1 10.3  14.0 14,0 16.4  21.4 
a1991.  —  bDifference between stock data 1996 and 1994.  —  cValues for fiscal years1995 und 1996. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; US Department of Commerce; Japan Ministry of Finance.   28 
  Cost advantages of CEECs have already declined in the course of income 
convergence toward EU levels and because of a number of regulations which the 
countries had to accept in order to qualify for future full membership. 
Furthermore, exchange rate binding and strong capital inflows have already been 
instrumental to increase the price of non-tradables thus eroding initial cost 
advantages. Between 1995 and 1998, all major CEECs’ currencies appreciated 
in real terms [Rosati et. al.: 10]. 
  To conclude, it is more likely that it was domestic investment in EU 
countries (which as mentioned above showed zero growth  in real terms in the 
first half of the nineties) which was substituted for by EU FDI in CEECs than 
EU FDI in Asia or other developing countries. 
IV.  Entering the Next Millennium: What Asia Can Expect from Further 
EU Integration Deepening and Widening 
1.  The Institutional Infrastructure: Strengthening the Growth Momentum from 
Integration Deepening Without Centralisation 
By the end of the millennium, the EU faces a number of unprecedented 
institutional  challenges which will profoundly shape the conditions under which 
partner countries maintain trade and capital transactions with the Union. Such 
institutional challenges have been part of deliberate political decision-taking and 
coincide with the economic challenges arising from shrinking economic distance 
and increasing tradability of goods, services, physical and human capital.    29 
  To mention but two of the institutional challenges, first the EU has 
irreversibly signalled integration widening toward CEECs in a stepwise 
approach. That will mean that the external economic relations of the CEECs and 
their underlying vested interests, for instance, toward Asia, will become part of 
EU external policies and will influence policy contents as well as the way how 
Europe negotiates policies. It is important to note that all acceding countries are 
small, economically open, relatively well-endowed with skilled labour but are 
poorly endowed with physical capital. Traditionally, CEEC governments have 
been prone to think in étatist terms, that is to assign redistributive functions to 
the public sector. However, the fact that their transformation into a market 
economy occurs at a time when pressure to deregulate and privatise has become 
a world-wide phenomenon, is likely to contain any excessive étatism.  
  Second, in the old EU, a massive rethinking of the role of the state has 
begun. The negative impact of inflexible labour markets on employment, the 
adverse incentives of pay-as-you-go social security systems on national savings 
together with the unsustainability of such systems under foreseeable 
demographic changes, and, as a third factor, the increasing mobility of the tax 
base which puts a strong barrier against the continuation of subsidising weak 
sectors and regions, have given rise to a strong revival of market forces. They 
have also impaired the credibility of guarantees of state authorities toward 
„business as usual“ and extrapolation of salient trends. With supra-national 
Europe on the one hand, gaining more identity due to the Euro and other tasks   30 
with scale economies, and with municipalities, cities and regions on the other 
hand gaining identities as well (for instance, as financiers of public services such 
as education and inner security), the in-between nation state stands to lose to 
both layers. Regions which neighbour to boundaries of countries begin to define 
common targets and instruments and thus add to borders become increasingly 
porous because of the SMP. Hence, integration deepening adds to redressing the 
role of the nation state without necessarily strengthening centralisation in 
Brussels. 
  The so-called Agenda 2000 which aims at accelerating reforms inside the 
core EU in order to make the accession of new member states manageable 
examplifies the new trend: limiting state support to a level which in financially 
sustainable in an enlarged Union, replacing price support by income support and 
cutting the support volume, reallocating support in favour of the new periphery, 
reconciling support with international commitments such as the UR. 
2. Speculating about Consequences from Changes in EU Institutional 
Infrastructure for Asia 
Given the still relatively weak mutual trade and capital linkages between Europe 
and Asia (relative to linkages to the Mediterranean countries, the ACP countries, 
Eastern Europe), the „naive“ scenario of consequences for Asia could be to 
extrapolate the current trend. Such scenario could be explained with elements of 
inertia in current account transactions compared to the volatility and dynamics 
of those capital account transactions which are not simply the flip coin of current   31 
account transactions. But even if we disregard the capital account for a moment, 
the „naive“ scenario does not seem well-founded for three reasons. 
  First, EU integration deepening can stimulate EU growth through 
accelerated structural change (de-industrialisation, de-regulation) and process 
innovation (outsourcing inside and outside the EU). Asia can benefit from this 
growth momentum in four ways, first by growing EU import demand for Asian 
supply, second, by acting as a host for EU outlocated production chains, third by 
enjoying term of trade gains due to European companies becoming competitive 
international suppliers of service-intensive products (such as the aircraft industry 
or the environment technology) in which Asia is a net importer, and fourth, by 
participating in alliances for providing global services with increasing returns of 
scale (airline services, maritime transport, internet services). 
  Second, the 1995 new entrants (Austria, Finland, Sweden) are small open 
economies which strengthen the relatively free-trade oriented group within the 
EU as far as manufactures is concerned (for instance, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
the UK and Germany). Hence, this could be seen as reducing the risk of 
protectionist policy decisions being taken by the Council [Widgrén, 1995; Bilal, 
1998]. Against this optimistic view, however, well-founded sceptical views 
cannot be suppressed. First, EU trade policies remain a substitute for a common 
foreign policy which is still lacking. As foreign policies by nature are 
discriminatory thus treating each partner state as special, so are trade policies   32 
[Messerlin, 1997]. This substitute role acts against MFN rules and explains why 
the EU has by far the largest set of bilateral „hub and spoke“ agreements which 
do not reflect what the late Harry Johnson once described as a „free traders view 
on preferences“.5 Furthermore, each enlargement makes compromising on 
changes of a common trade policy more difficult because of the larger number 
of conflicting vested interests thus favouring the status quo. If this status quo 
was characterised by trade restrictions, such restrictions could be maintained. 
Finally, the enlargement toward the CEECs could strengthen the voting position 
of low-income countries which may claim for infant industry protection in a 
transition period during which they have to lower their external protection to the 
EU level. In anticipation of such claims, the EU could be tempted to take infant 
industry protection arguments of prospective member states into consideration 
when starting negotiations on the new multilateral round and thus become 
reluctant to liberalise trade in these industries. In a number of products, basically 
steel, footwear, textiles and clothing, Asian suppliers could become affected. 
  Yet, in my view, the optimistic view prevails with respect to Asia. The EU 
enlargement is very likely to offer options for Asia to penetrate new markets 
more rapidly than would have been possible without accession to the EU. In 
                                                            
5  Instead, one could label the hub-and-spoke systems as protectionist (trade diversion-
oriented) if they are geared to favour privileged trading partners such as the ACP 
countries. Recent difficulties of Thailand to find unrestricted access to the EU for deep-
frozen shrimps, for instance, are rooted in the EU policy to defend privileged market 
access for competing ACP countries. This policy, however, has often failed because of 
supply-rooted constraints to become competitive.     33 
particular, liberalisation among CEECs is driven by the accession process and 
thus allows Asian suppliers to benefit from all advantages of a large unrestricted 
market in Central and Eastern Europe and not only from the opening up of 
individual countries. 
  Third, EU deepening and widening can be expected to impact positively 
upon the attractiveness of Europe as a host for private risk capital. The EMU – if 
not challenged by severe asymmetric shocks (see below) – will deepen financial 
markets in Europe and encourage innovations in financial services. Profound 
demographic changes in ageing Europe will require such innovations to emerge 
rapidly in order to substitute for the no longer viable pay-as-you-go social 
security schemes. In addition to ageing core EU member states, the CEECs 
urgently need private risk capital in order to replace an obsolete capital stock 
from the Socialist legacy. It seems difficult, however, to assess whether enlarged 
Europe will become a stronger competitor for private risk capital for Asia. On 
the one hand, early signals of tight monetary and fiscal discipline in the EMU 
region (in order to dissipate any concerns about the stability of the Euro) 
supported by scale economies due to removing financial market segmentation in 
Europe could lead to downward pressure on EMU interest rates and thus 
stimulate  investment activities. The current account balance of EMU could 
move toward a surplus. On the other hand, these early changes could be 
followed by stronger growth and import demand, rising interest rates and an 
appreciation of the Euro. As a result, Europe would absorb more capital inflows.   34 
Given that the full impact of integration widening and higher attractiveness of 
the enlarged Union for risk capital can be expected to coincide more with the 
second phase, the medium term message for Asia would be that Europe becomes 
more competitive for risk capital. In other words, Europe is very likely to 
become a more attractive place for allocating its own savings. This does not 
mean that investment which has already been installed in Asia will be diverted 
back to Europe but it is possible that the relation between fresh domestic 
investment (in the enlarged Union) and FDI (outside the Union) will change to 
the benefit of the former. 
3.  The Monetary Sector: Speculating about the Impact of the Euro on Asia 
a. Overall  scenarios 
There is nothing more speculative than the possible impact of the Euro on Asia. 
Given the current state of knowledge, it is only feasible to stylise the possible 
direction of the external dimension arising from replacing European currencies 
by a single currency. 
  First, the impact can become effective via various links which cover the 
three different functions of a currency (medium of exchange, unit of account, 
store of value). The three functions materialise in the functions of transaction 
(invoice) currency, reserve currency, anchor currency and as an asset currency in 
international financial markets. For these functions to emerge outside the EU, it 
is essential that the European Central Band (ECB) can accrue the same   35 
reputation as a resort of stability and clear monetary guidance as the German 
Bundesbank and that EU financial markets can benefit from greater depth and 
breadth, lower costs of financial transactions due to removal of market 
segmentation and narrowing interest spreads between national bonds. 
  Second, whether or not a currency is a leading international currency, can 
be gauged by differences between the economic size of a country in world 
economic transactions and the use of its currency. In this respect, the picture is 
clear. By major possible uses (invoice currency in world trade, international 
bond offerings, developing country debt, global foreign exchange reserves), the 
Dollar is much more widely used than indicated by the share of the US in 
international trade or world GDP [Tavlas, 1998]. So is the sum of European 
currencies if intra-EU trade is excluded. However, this degree of 
internationalisation is much weaker than for the US. The use of the Yen is far 
behind the Japanese share in world trade. This pattern emerges even more 
clearly if instead of European currencies only the DM is taken as a reference 
[Hendriksen 1998, cited in Collignon and Mundschenk: 81]. According to 
Hendriksen, the DM had a share as invoice currency in world exports of 15.3 per 
cent in 1992 (US Dollar: 47.6 per cent, Yen: 4.8 per cent) and a degree of 
internationalisation6 of 1.4. For 1999, Hendriksen „guestimates“ a share of the 
                                                            
6  The degree of internationalisation is measured as the ratio between the share of exports 
invoiced in the currency of a country and the share of the country in world exports.   36 
Euro as invoice currency of 23-33 per cent and a degree of internationalisation 
of 1.4-2. 
  Third, like the US, the EU is an economy with a large domestic market 
after intra-EU trade has become domestic trade. Thus, the share of the EU in 
world exports will be at the level of the US (about 15 per cent) and the extra-EU 
export share in EU GDP will be less than 10 per cent (the latter share being 
smaller than the respective US share). This could mean that the susceptibility of 
the monetary union against external shocks declines while the susceptibility 
against EU country-specific (asymmetric) shocks increases. To cope with such 
shocks, countries hold foreign exchange reserves. Such demand for reserves 
could shrink for the Union in total and could also affect demand for holding US 
Dollars. In general, with more world-wide transactions now labelled „domestic“ 
instead of „cross-border“, demand for foreign exchange reserves can be 
expected to decline. 
  Fourth, for third countries, it is important to assess both the medium trend 
in US-Euro exchange rates as well as the volatility in bilateral exchange rates. 
To begin with the former, it is argued that in order to sustain the Maastricht 
criteria, fiscal contraction in Euroland would continue and thus contribute to 
lower interest rates and to lower the value of the Euro. Public investment would 
be substituted for by private investment. In a second stage, an equilibrating 
mechanism would be expected to lead to an appreciation of the Euro [Funke,   37 
Kennedy, 1997: 12]. Such mechanism could overlap with a medium-term 
confidence-building in favour of the Euro provided asymmetric shocks can be 
fought (see above). As far as volatility is concerned, there is no clear position. 
On the one hand, it is argued that with more transactions becoming domestic, the 
central banks of the US, EMU and Japan would care less about exchange rate 
volatility than did individual european central banks because the risk of 
importing inflation would become smaller [ibid: 13]. Hence, more than in the 
past, the three banks would follow their own nominal anchors without any 
exchange rate targeting. Exchange rate volatility would increase. This view 
assumes that european central banks in the past had some sort of exchange rate 
targeting. However, this was not true for the only EU currency for which this 
argument would have mattered, the DM as the anchor currency. The DM had its 
own nominal anchor, preannounced money supply expansion, and the other 
currencies either openly or implicitly pegged to the DM. There was no exchange 
rate targeting in recent years. On the other hand, there is the argument that in an 
early stage during which the ECB had not yet a clear internal nominal anchor 
(neither money supply expansion nor a direct inflation target), the ECB would 
take relative stability of exchange rates to the Dollar more into account 
following financial markets preference for a clear anchor. If at all, this might be 
a problem of transition as long as monetary policies within EMU are not as co-
ordinated as within the past European Exchange Rate (ERM). Presumably, the 
ECB will soon establish and follow its own anchor especially if there are no   38 
bad-weather conditions with asymmetric shocks and deep recession. However, 
an own internal ECB anchor does not imply necessarily more volatility if the US 
and Europe become more similar in economic size, domestic market orientation 
and market flexibility, the latter being a result of ongoing structural reforms in 
European labour markets. 
  Fifth, the potential role of the Euro as reserve currency and transaction 
currency depends on the substitution process between individual European 
currencies and the Euro. First of all, for all member countries of the EMU, assets 
denominated in European currencies of member states change their nature from 
„foreign exchange assets“ into „domestic assets“. This includes assets held by 
European national central banks. That means that the potential of the Euro as 
reserve currency is smaller relative to that of the DM and other European 
currencies. This effect arising from inside EMU can eventually be countervailed 
by greater attractiveness for non-European asset holders not only to replace their 
assets denominated in European currencies fully by Euro but to replace their 
Dollar or Yen assets partly by Euro-denominated assets for various reasons. 
Such reasons could include portfolio diversification, growing trade links to the 
Euro economic space, stronger borrowing in Euro and hence stronger asset 
holding in Euro in order to avoid a mismatch of currency denominations. Again, 
fast progress in reputation building would help to enhance this attractiveness. 
Arguments pro increased use of the Euro in financial transactions are based on 
the weight of the Euro economic space in world trade (invoice currency), in   39 
inter-central banks official transactions (reserve currency and anchor currency 
for Mediterranean and CEECs) and the development of deep and wide Euro 
financial markets. There are estimates which assume a market share of the Euro 
of 35 per cent in international portfolios, hence, almost at the level of the Dollar 
[Leany, 1994]. 
b.  Possible implications for Asia 
There are a number of developing countries’ regions and transformation 
countries which traditionally maintain strong trade links with the EU, receive 
sizeable amounts of aid from the EU area and/or have used European currencies 
as anchor currencies or reserve currencies. Typical examples are the North 
African countries, the CEECs and the member states of the francophone 
currency area in West and Central Africa (the CFA-Franc area). For these 
countries, the likely impact of the Euro has already been discussed [Khemani 
and Nord, 1997; Memedovic, 1998; Mogni, 1998]. Regions with which the EU 
maintains relatively weak current account transactions (such as Asia) have not 
been subject to analyses except for the Caribbean member states of the ACP 
group for which income from providing consumer services (European tourists) 
and revenues from exporting agricultural products to Europe (for instance, 
bananas) have been important. Interestingly enough, Caribbean countries often 
peg to the Dollar while maintaining relatively strong current account 
transactions with Europe under the ACP agreement. Under these auspices,   40 
changes in the Euro/$ rate compared to the DM-area/$ rate are expected to have 
large effects on the international competitiveness of these countries compared to 
suppliers of competing products pegging to the DM-area (followed by the peg to 
the Euro) [Khemani, Nord, 1997].7 
  To approach possible impacts of the Euro upon Asia, one may first start 
from the state of bilateral current account transactions and take this as a proxy 
for the possible importance of the Euro as an invoice currency. Given that the 
trade links (including services) have been  relatively small and not overly 
dynamic as concerns Asian exports to Europe and given that commodity trade 
(oil, mineral ores, rubber) is traditionally invoiced in Dollar, there is no dramatic 
increase to expect from the invoice currency function. There are differences 
among Asian countries (the NIEs being traditionally linked more to the APEC 
area and the ASEAN countries traditionally more linked to Euroland in current 
account transactions) but these differences do not change the overall result. 
Unless trade relations improve substantially, it is unlikely that the Euro will gain 
invoice currency shares at the expense of the Dollar. 
  One should expect more information to be available for the currency 
composition of reserves of Asian Central Banks to assess the likely importance 
                                                            
7  It is not surprising that the impact of EMU will be transmitted through the Euro-Dollar 
exchange rate and interest rate differentials between the Euro area and Dollar area. To the 
extent that these countries (such as the member countries of the Eastern Caribbean 
Currency Union) maintain a fixed single currency peg vis-à-vis the Dollar a devaluation of 
the Euro against the Dollar would make tourist services more expensive for European 
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of the Euro as reserve currency. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Dooley, 
Lizondo and Mathieson [1989] analysing the determinants of the currency 
composition of foreign exchange reserves used IMF data and, in order to 
maintain confidentiality of the data file, ran all regressions blind without any 
country specific parameters [ibid: 410]. The IMF itself [IMF, 1997] anonymises 
such information by publishing aggregate data on the currency composition for 
industrial and developing countries separately. For developing countries, the 
share of Deutschmark, French Franc and Netherlands Guilders (as the only listed 
Euroland members’ currencies) in total identified official holdings of foreign 
exchange declined from 14.4 per cent to 12.6 per cent [ibid: 159] but again data 
unreliability is large as shown by the increasing share of unspecified currencies. 
It seems that this indicates a lack of information on currency composition in 
official holdings of newly acceded Fund members.  
  To my knowledge, the only disaggregated analyses for some Asian coun-
tries’ currency composition of official holdings has been published by Tavlas 
and Ozeki [1992] and Tavlas [1997]. These  analyses cover the period of the 
eighties and early nineties do not allow to identify individual Asian countries 
(Table 6). Only three Euroland currencies are displayed individually (DM, FF, 
HFL) apart from the Yen, Dollar and Pound Sterling. The share of Euroland 
currencies was shown to have steadily declined over the eighties while the 
Dollar enjoyed an all-time-high in 1995 when 60 per cent of official holdings 
were kept in this currency. The Yen’s role fluctuated in the range of 12-27 per   42 
cent. Fluctuations are partly due to valuation effects. Without knowing which 
countries were in the sample it seems futile to speculate about the driving forces 
behind the strengthened role of the Dollar but the undisputed role of the Dollar 
as the anchor currency for most Asian countries (either with the fixed single 
currency peg or a large weight in a basket) can be expected to have fostered this 
leading role.8 Beyond that, the minor role of Euroland currencies in foreign 
exchange reserves is notable. 
 
 
Table 6 – Share of Euroland Currencies in Selected Asian Countries’ Official 
Holdings, 1980-1995 
  1980 1984 1986 1992 1995 
Deutschmark 20.6  14.6 16.7 16.3 14.6 
French  Franc  0.6 0.6 1.1 1.0 1.1 
Netherland  Guilder 2.8 1.9 2.2 1.2 1.1 
MEMO:       
US  Dollar  48.6 58.2 48.4 55.8 60.2 
Yen  13.9 16.3 22.8 14.2 12.3 
Pound  Sterling  3.0 3.5 3.6 6.3 6.0 
Source: Tavlas/Ozeki [1992: 40]; Tavlas [1997: 742]. 
                                                            
8  In a recent paper, Bénassy-Quéré [1998] supports the view of the undisputed role of the 
Dollar by showing that there has never been a Yen bloc in Asia although there was an 
increasing use of the Yen for denominating the debt (see below Table 7) and also for 
denominating trade transactions. She concludes that there is a mismatch between trade 
blocs, capital blocs and currency blocs in Asia. Trade was increasingly intensive among 
Asian countries other than Japan, capital flows were most intensive between Japan and the 
other Asian countries and exchange rate targeting was sustained to the Dollar as long as 
possible.   43 
 
  Differences between Asian countries emerge if it is asked which 
currencies Asian countries prefer if they borrow long-term abroad. Except for 
China which has increasingly borrowed in Dollar, the Yen seems to have play a 
much larger role than in foreign exchange reserves during the nineties (Table 7). 
This role may reflect Japan’s strong engagement as a bilateral and multilateral 
donor within Asia and the active role of its banks in supporting trade and capital 
links of Asian countries to Japan by providing loans denominated in Yen. Even 
if one would assume Euroland currencies to participate in so-called multiple 
currency lending, the negligible role of the DM and the FF as debt currencies for 
Asian countries cannot be denied. This role while also declining during the 
nineties has always been much smaller than the role of reserve currencies. This 
holds in particular for the DM where the discrepancy between reserve currency 
function and debt  
  
Table 7 – Share of Euroland Currencies in Asian Countries’ Long-Term Debt, 1990-1996 
 Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  China 
  1990 1993 1996 1990 1993 1996 1990 1993 1996 1990 1993 1996 1990 1993 1996 
Deutschmark  5.0 4.8 4.8 5.9 3.0 0.8 1.5 1.4 1.6 3.6 2.3 2.1 3.1 1.0 1.4 
French  Franc  3.4 3.3 3.7 2.8 0.8 0.5 1.5 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 
MEMO:                 
Yen  34.6 37.6 34.5 36.5 37.5 28.0 31.0 38.3 35.3 43.2 50.1 45.4 30.4 21.0 15.9 
Pound  Sterling  1.4 0.9 1.2 1.6 3.4 1.2 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.2 
Swiss  Franc  0.4 0.5 0.8 3.6 2.4 1.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 3.9 2.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 
US  Dollar  21.0 19.9 24.3 31.8 29.4 55.7 36.2 30.4 33.8 17.0 22.6 32.1 29.1 54.2 64.8 
Multiple currency,  34.3  33.6  39.7 17.7 23.6 11.9 28.2 28.6 28.0 30.8 21.3 18.8 36.2 23.1 17.5 
S D R ,   o t h e r   c u r r e n c i e s                  
                 
Source: World Bank [1998].   45 
currency function has been significant (unlike the FF being equally weak in the 
two functions). 
  Lessons to be drawn from this insufficient empirical bottom line with 
respect to the likely role of the Euro are almost impossible. If one departs from 
the assumption of a high short-term substitutability between functions fulfilled 
by the DM and the European currencies pegging to the DM on the one hand and 
the Euro on the other hand, the Euro could be expected to become immediately 
relevant for Asian countries as a reserve currency followed by the invoice 
currency function. The function of a transaction currency in international capital 
markets depends very much on the nature of such transactions. As concerns the 
function of a currency in which Asian countries would prefer to borrow, the 
Euro will have to offer scale economies and reputation first before it can surpass 
the former national currencies of Euroland in this role in Asia. Only to the extent 
that Japanese private capital exports to Asia would decline and/or the Japanese 
donor role in public capital would shrink, the Euro could incorporate part of the 
function hitherto taken by the Japanese currency. Finally, given weak and even 
declining functions as reserve currency and debt currency in Asia, Euroland 
currencies cannot be expected to be substituted for by the Euro as an anchor 
currency. Among all functions, the anchor role of the Euro in Asia seems to be 
the most unlikely one. 
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V. Concluding  Remarks 
Both Europe and Asia live in interesting times (to rephrase the Chinese curse). 
These times have in common that seemingly well-established structures and 
patterns have broken in the two regions. Such breaks were deliberately taken 
into account in Europe through the processes of integration deepening and 
widening while they have been unintentionally set in motion in Asia because of 
the financial crisis. Only the implications of the former breaks were subject of 
this paper but how they will be received on the Asian side will also be 
influenced by the breaks caused by the crisis. 
  Past implications of European integration for Asia up to the Single Market 
effects focused strongly on current account transactions between the two regions 
(merchandise trade and trade in services). Projections on whether this integration 
stage would be beneficial or detrimental for Asia have been found to differ 
widely according to differences in parameter estimates or type of analysis but 
the common bottom line was that the effects were unlikely to be large in both 
directions. The Single Market effects have carried the debate beyond the current 
account to the capital account. It was investment diversion to the detriment of 
Asia which became the key issue but again unanimous empirical evidence could 
not be found simply because the medium-term Single Market effects overlapped 
with the short-term effects of the opening of former Socialist economies to the 
world market. European investors immediately responded to the incentives of 
tapping the potential of the near-by market endowed with relatively skilled   47 
labour and low labour costs long before the institutional incentives of the Europe 
Agreements became effective and began to erode parts of cost competitiveness. 
This was not investment diversion caused by discriminatory trade policy. Such 
policies have become effective later but again their static „once and for all“ 
effects are unlikely to be large since the CEECs have simultaneously lowered 
their external barriers toward imports from non-EU countries in their role as 
participants of the Uruguay Round. This parallel event in the multilateral arena 
has of course also mitigated possible discrimination effects arising from the 
Single Market. 
  With the Euro project becoming a reality with a large number of first-
round participants, the discussion on integration effects for Asia has reached a 
new quality for several reasons. First, the effects are likely to focus on the 
capital account transactions which – with the exception of FDI – were hitherto 
not in the centre of EU integration effects for non-members. Second, policy 
discrimination in the sense of treating EMU candidates unequally could have 
been deplored by a group of potential first-round members downgraded to 
second-round members all belonging to Europe. But Asian countries have been 
far from this group. Third, the foreseeable effects of EMU for Asian countries 
are small compared to the effects for countries pegging to European currencies. 
The anchor currency function is essential for the magnitude of effects and this 
function is not relevant for the Euro in Asia. Nor are probably other effects such   48 
as those arising from international borrowing by Asian countries, at least in the 
short run. 
  Both integration deepening and widening will make Europe much more 
diverse, with different speeds of integration between core and periphery 
countries, sometimes called „variable geometry“. This will make the threats of a 
„Super-Fortress Europe“ which have often been articulated in Asia even more 
implausible than before. Instead, the historical challenge of Western Europe 
could be to accelerate the process of integrating Central and Eastern Europe 
more rapidly into the world market than it would have been possible without EU 
integration widening. In other words, the perspective of EU membership has 
made economic transformation irreversible, credible and has therefore anchored 
monetary stability, structural change, and market institution-building as 
indispensable principles underlying all decision-making in CEECs (unlike in the 
former Soviet Union). For Asia, enlarged Europe is therefore a chance to benefit 
more rapidly from the internal efficiency-enhancing effect of integration 
widening than to suffer from the external discrimination effect.   49 
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